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Abstract
This paper studies the driving forces behind the considerable expansion of the underground econ-
omy during the late 1990s. I propose a novel explanation for this phenomenon: the sharp increase
in market competition worldwide, which reduces prices and profits and drives firms into the shadow
economy. Empirical evidence from a panel covering 42 countries from 1995 to 2000 shows that in-
creased competition is indeed correlated with an expansion of the underground economy. The eﬀect
is weaker in high-income, high-tax, low-corruption countries that provide public services which make
it worthwhile for firms to operate in the oﬃcial economy despite growing competitive pressure.
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1 Introduction
The underground economy1 is widely understood as an unpleasant consequence of the
burden of taxes and social security contributions, excessive market regulation, and inef-
fective law enforcement and corruption (see Schneider and Enste (2000), Johnson et al.
(1998), Friedman et al. (2000), Lemieux et al. (1994)). Although none of the common
measures of the phenomenon is immune to criticism 2 , there is evidence that the late
1990s saw a striking increase in the size of the underground sectors of both industrialized
and developing countries. Interestingly, this increase cannot be fully accounted for by
the movements in any of the conventional explanatory factors listed above. Hence, the
question arises what induced so many businesses to move to the underground economy
during this period.
The explanation for this remarkable development could lie in a common change to the
environment in which these businesses operate. Now, it is well-known that the 1990s were
characterized by a sharp increase in market competition worldwide, which was a conse-
quence of reduced trade barriers, market liberalization programs, and improved commu-
nication and transportation (Gupta (1997)). This paper asks the question whether this
increase in competitive pressure can help us explain the expansion of the underground
economy.
The theoretic literature on this question is very scarce. Some readers may be reminded
of Shleifer’s (2004) argument that competition may promote unethical behavior (e.g. child
labor, corruption, etc.). He highlights the trade-oﬀ between cost savings and the firm
1 defined as economic activities which are concealed from public authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and social
security contributions, and to avoid compliance with certain legal standards (e.g. labor market regulations, trade licenses)
2 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for estimates of the size of the underground economy in numerous countries and a
critical discussion of the diﬀerent measurement methods.
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owner’s private utility of ethical behavior, and finds that an increase in competition tilts
this trade-oﬀ in favor of unethical behavior. But unlike the types of behavior studied by
Shleifer (2004), tax evasion might not even be classified as ”unethical” by many people.3
A model that does without ethical considerations is proposed by Karlinger (2008).
Again, cost savings are the primary benefit of operating in the underground economy.
However, these cost savings have to be traded oﬀ against the risk of being detected and
fined by the tax authority. The prediction of this model is that, in equilibrium, an increase
in competition makes it more likely for underground activities to spread in the industry.
To my knowledge, there is only one empirical study of the link between the shadow
economy and market competition, namely Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). They study one
particular form of intensified competition - the reduction of trade barriers - in two devel-
oping countries, namely Brazil and Colombia. While there is no evidence of a relationship
between trade policy and the informal sector in Brazil, they do find evidence of such a
relationship in Colombia, but only for the period preceding a major labor market reform
that increased the flexibility of the Colombian labor market.
My paper wants to broaden our understanding of these results by extending the analysis
to a panel of 42 countries covering the period from 1995 to 2000. The panel covers all
major OECD countries as well as a number of developing countries, mainly from Latin
America and Asia. Data on the size of the underground economy come from Schneider
(2005) as well as own calculations. The remaining data were drawn from several World
Bank sources and from the Global Competitiveness Report.
To deal with the possible endogeneity problem when explaining the size of a country’s
shadow economy by the tax rates in this country, I instrument for these tax rates by the
3 See Torgler and Schneider (2007), and Alm and Torgler (2006), on cross-country diﬀerences in tax morale
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corresponding tax rates of a (randomly assigned) neighboring country. The identifying
assumption is that a country’s tax rates will not change in response to an expansion of
the underground economy in any of its neighboring countries.
The first main finding of this cross-country analysis is that more intense competition
is indeed correlated with an expansion of the underground economy: A one-standard-
deviation increase in the competition variable is associated with an increase in the size of
the underground economy (as share of oﬃcial GDP) of 4 percentage points, or 22 percent
of the standard deviation of the latter. I also find a significant impact of per-capita GDP
and labor market regulation, while the eﬀect of tax rates on the size of the underground
economy is somewhat ambiguous.
The second main finding of my empirical analysis is that the impact of competition on
the size of the underground economy is weaker in countries where per-capita GDP and tax
rates are high, and corruption is low. Rich countries with high government revenue and
low corruption are the ones that can oﬀer high-quality public enforcement services which
make it worthwhile for firms to opt for the oﬃcial economy even when competitive pressure
increases. This may also explain why the expansion of the underground sector was not
as strong in the OECD and CEE countries as it was in Asia and Latin America, even
though all four subsamples experienced a similar increase in the intensity of competition
during the late 1990s.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in this study. Given
that every possible measure of the underground economy is susceptible to criticism, I per-
form my analysis for two diﬀerent measures. The first measure is based on the currency-
demand approach (drawn from Schneider (2005)), and results are presented in Section 3.
The second measure is based on the so-called electricity method, where I use own cal-
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culations giving rise to a larger sample (along the time dimension) allowing for in-depth
analysis, presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the Data
The analysis is based on a panel that covers 42 countries (OECD, transition and develop-
ing countries) for the years 1995 to 2000.4 The underlying data were drawn from several
sources: Schneider’s (2005) estimates of the underground economy as percentage of of-
ficial GDP; the World Bank’s ”World Development Indicators”, ”Doing Business” and
”Labor Regulation” databases; and the ”Global Competitiveness Report” (GCR), which
is published annually by the World Economic Forum.
The World Bank data sources are discussed in more detail below. The measures of
most variables contained in the Global Competitiveness Report are based on the results
of the Executive Opinion Survey, which asks some 4,000 top and middle managers in the
surveyed countries for a personal assessment of the variables of interest.5 Each respondent
assigned an integer from 1 to 7 to each of the questions contained in the survey, and the
Global Competitiveness Report reports the average response for each variable and country.
2.1 The Dependent Variable
The two measures for the size of the underground economy used in the following deserve
some more discussion. Of course, the very nature of the subject matter makes it diﬃcult
to quantify it. The data series in Schneider (2005) are based on the so-called ”currency-
4The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea
(Rep.), Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, UK, USA, and Venezuela.
5Note that the managers’ assessments may not be representative for the opinion held by the general public in their
country; however, for the purposes of our analysis, what I am interested in is precisely the perception of firm-level decision-
makers, as they are the ones who choose whether or not their firm will operate in the underground economy.
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demand approach”, while the second measure of the underground economy I will use
is obtained from own calculations based on the so-called ”physical input” method (or
Kaufmann-Kaliberda method).
(a) Currency-Demand Approach
The underlying assumption is that shadow transactions are settled through cash pay-
ments, so as to leave no traces for the authorities. An increase in the shadow economy will
therefore increase the demand for currency. This approach originates in Cagan (1958).
To isolate the resulting excessive demand for currency, an equation for currency demand
is estimated over time, controlling for all possible conventional factors, such as income,
payment habits, interest rates etc. The increase in currency demand unexplained by the
conventional factors is then attributed to the rising tax burden and other factors leading
people to operate in the shadow economy.
The basic regression equation is
ln
µ
C
M2
¶
t
= β0 + β1 ln (1 + TW )t + β2 ln
µ
WS
Y
¶
t
+ β3 lnRt + β4 ln
µ
Y
N
¶
t
+ ut
where ln denotes natural logarithms, C/M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and
deposit accounts, TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the
shadow economy), WS/Y is the share of wages and salaries in national income (to capture
changing payment and money holding patterns), R is the interest paid on savings deposits
(to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) and Y/N is per capita income.
A base year has to be fixed for which the shadow economy is set to zero. Next, assuming
the same income velocity for currency in the shadow economy as for money (measured
by M1) in the oﬃcial economy, the size of the shadow economy can be computed and
compared to the oﬃcial GDP.
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Unfortunately, the estimates provided by Schneider (2005) are only available for 3 out
of the six periods covered by the GCR (namely 1995, 1998 and 2000); moreover, for the
year 1998, this data set only covers 21 OECD countries out of the full set of 42 countries.
(b) Electricity Approach
To measure overall (oﬃcial and unoﬃcial) economic activity, Kaufmann and Kaliberda
(1996) assume that electricity consumption is the single best physical indicator of overall
economic activity. With an electricity-output elasticity close to one, the diﬀerence between
the growth of oﬃcial GDP and the growth of electricity consumption can be attributed
to the growth of the shadow economy.
For the base year, t = 1995, we have data on country i’s oﬃcial GDP, denoted by
GDPi,t, and Schneider’s (2005) estimates of the size of the underground economy as share
of oﬃcial GDP, denoted by si,t. Define country i’s total economic activity in t = 1995 as
TEAi,t ≡ (1 + si,t)GDPi,t.
Denote country i’s total electricity consumption in t as ECi,t (the data on oﬃcial GDP
and on electricity consumption were drawn from the World Bank World Development
Indicators). The growth rate of electricity consumption,
gi,t+1 =
ECi,t+1
ECi,t
is then used as indicator for the growth rate of total economic activity: TEAi,t+1 =
gi,t+1TEAt,i. Then, we can infer the size of the underground economy in t+ 1 as
si,t+1 =
TEAi,t+1 −GDPi,t+1
GDPi,t+1
This procedure is repeated for the years 1997 to 2000. The correlation between this
measure and the Schneider estimates is 0.79. While the electricity-approach measure
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of the underground economy is certainly less sophisticated than the currency-demand
estimates, it has two main advantages:
(i) data are available for all six periods covered by the GCR (thus providing suﬃciently
many observations to perform proper panel analysis), and
(ii) the measure is directly derived from consumption of a physical input, and so we
do not have to worry about interactions between the variables used to construct the
currency-demand estimates and the explanatory variables used in the regressions, which
are explained below.
2.2 The Regressors
The choice of regressors used in this analysis is driven by our hypothesis that increased
competition leads to an expansion of the underground economy. To test this hypothesis,
we need a measure of competition, as well as controls for the common explanatory factors
used in the literature (see Schneider and Enste (2000)).
Several measures are available for the intensity of labor regulation: I will focus on
the ”Employment Laws Index” from the World Bank’s ”Labor Regulation” database.
This index reflects a comprehensive assessment of the legal provisions prevailing in each
country in January 2002. It takes values from 0 to 3, with higher values consistent with
more regulation. As a supplementary measure, I will also use the GCR’s ”Flexibility”
Index, which is derived from survey responses to the question whether ”working hours
can be easily adjusted (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)”. Unlike the ”Employment
Laws Index”, this measure is available for all six years covered by our panel.6
6Table 2D in Appendix A provides correlations between these two measures as well as a third alternative measure,
namely the ”Employment Laws Index” of the World Bank’s ”Doing Business” data base (which was constructed in a similar
manner as the index of the same name in the ”Labor Regulation” data base, and refers to January 2003).
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Similarly, there are two possible measures for entry barriers: The cost of starting a
new business is directly measured as percentage of per-capita GNI in the World Bank’s
”Doing Business” database for the year 2003, while the GCR provides response averages
on whether ”Starting a new business is generally easy (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly
agree)” for each of the six years of interest.
A measure for corruption will be included for the following reasons: First of all, cor-
ruption is likely to undermine the enforcement of tax legislation (Bull and Newell (2003)),
thereby favoring underground economic activity, and second, the findings of Johnson et al.
(1998) suggest that corruption is an important control variable in itself. The corruption
question included in the GCR asks whether ”Irregular, additional payments connected
with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments,
police protection, or loan applications are very rare (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly
agree)”.7
The key variable we are interested in is the intensity of competition between firms,
in the sense that firms see each other as close rivals for consumer patronage. Following
Ades and Di Tella (1999), I use a survey measure for competition, based on the question
whether ”Competition in local markets is intense and market shares fluctuate constantly
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)”.8 Finally, I will control for per-capita GDP (in
logs) as well as the income tax rate, corporate tax rate and VAT rates.
To convince the reader of the steady growth of the underground economy and the
co-movement of competition during the late 1990s, Table 1 shows results of a regression
of the two measures of the underground economy, as well as the competition measure, on
7Alternative measures are provided by the World Bank’s ”Governance Indicators” database (”Perceptions of Corruption”
and ”Rule of Law”) and by Transparency International (”Corruption Perceptions Index”) - see correlations in Table 2D in
Appendix A.
8Alternative measures are ”share of imports in GDP” (WB WDI) and the ”eﬀectiveness of antitrust policies” (GCR).
Table 2D in Appendix A reports the correlations between these measures.
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a time trend, controlling for country-fixed eﬀects.
= Insert Table 1 here =
Both measures of the underground economy feature a positive and significant time
trend for the full sample; however, the two measures diﬀer in the contribution to this
overall trend by each of the four subsamples corresponding to OECD, CEE, Asian and
Latin American countries: while Schneider’s estimates show very similar positive trends
for each subsample, the electricity-approach estimates suggest that the trend was strongly
positive only in the Asian and Latin American countries, and negative in the OECD and
CEE subsamples.
A likely reason for this diﬀerence between the two measures is that the electricity-
approach estimates are to some extent confounded by changes in electricity consumption
patterns that are unrelated to underground activities. During the period under examina-
tion, a number of Asian and Latin American countries in the sample (Indonesia, Chile,
Brazil, Peru) were engaged in massive electrification programs bringing access to electric-
ity to households that previously had no access. Other countries in these subsamples,
like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, India, Thailand, Malaysia, China, Philippines,
and Indonesia, were undergoing privatization programs which changed the electricity pro-
duction and distribution system (see Jamasb (2006)). These policies are likely to have
contributed to electricity consumption in these countries growing faster than GDP.
At the same time, some governments, in particular European, have been quite active
in inducing a more eﬃcient use of electricity, which may partly explain the underpropor-
tional growth of electricity consumption relative to GDP growth in the OECD subsample.
Therefore, the electricity-approach estimates should be taken with a pinch of salt. How-
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ever, the regression results obtained from these estimates (see Tables 4 and 5) are hard
to reconcile with the suspicion that the electricity-approach estimates measure something
completely unrelated to underground activity. Rather, they should be seen as complemen-
tary to the results obtained from Schneider’s estimates (see Table 3), which have other
shortcomings (see Schneider and Enste (2000)).
Table 2A reports summary statistics for the variables of the first (smaller) sample,
based on Schneider’s estimates of the shadow economy, while Table 2B reports the anal-
ogous statistics for the second sample, based on the electricity-approach estimates of the
shadow economy. Appendix A provides correlation matrices for all variables entering the
regressions (Table 2C) and for alternative measures of explanatory variables (Table 2D).
= Insert Tables 2A and 2B here =
3 Regression Results for Sample 1
We can now test our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The fiercer is competition, the more likely are underground activities to
spread in the economy.
The reasoning is as follows: A firm which operates in the underground economy can buy
its inputs, in particular labor, at a lower price (because it avoids payroll taxes, disregards
safety and health standards, etc.), thereby reducing its variable cost relative to a firm in
the oﬃcial economy. The underground firm can pass on its savings to consumers, which
will reduce market prices, and as a result its competitors’ profits fall. Thus, the oﬃcial
firm is put at a competitive disadvantage, and may have to choose between operating
underground as well, or going out of business.
After merging Schneider’s (2005) estimates of the shadow economy with the available
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data for the explanatory variables, we are left with 99 country-years for 42 countries. The
basic estimating equation for countries i = 1, . . . , 42, and t = 1, . . . , 6 can be written as
UE1it = β0i + β1COMPit + βXit + εit
where the dependent variable, UE1i, is ”underground economy”, β0i is a constant, COMPi
is ”competition”, Xi is the vector of controls (GDP,Corr, LR1, PT, IT,CT, V AT,EE1), and
εi is the error term. We are particularly interested in determining the size of β1 which
represents the elasticity of the size of the shadow economy with respect to intensity of
competition. Table 3 gives us a first impression of the relevance and magnitude of the
single variables.
= Insert Table 3 here =
Regression (1) in Table 3 was performed on the stacked data, without controlling
for any country-specific eﬀects. Analysis of the residuals indicates that country-specific
eﬀects are likely to be present. Therefore, Regression (2) controls for country-specific
fixed eﬀects9, while Regression (3) includes country-specific time trends. Regression (4)
has competition as the only common explanatory variable, while controlling for both
country-specific fixed eﬀects and time trends.
First of all, we see that the competition coeﬃcient has the positive sign we expected,
and is significant in Regressions (1) and (4). The insignificance in Regressions (2) and (3)
may be due to the relatively low number of observations available (relative to the number
of coeﬃcients). It is all the more remarkable that the coeﬃcient is still significant in
Regression (4), which includes not only fixed eﬀects but also country-specific time trends.
9Recall that the main measures for labor regulation and start-up cost, LR1 and EE1, are only available for one year, so
they do not show when including country-fixed eﬀects.
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The coeﬃcient on labor regulation appears to be consistently significant and positive.
The corruption coeﬃcient has a negative sign in Regressions (1) and (3), and is significant
in Regression (1), which is in line with the link between corruption and the shadow
economy found by Johnson et al. (1998). With the exception of the VAT rate, which is
significant in Regression (1) and has the expected positive sign, the coeﬃcients on the tax
rates are quite surprising. Both the payroll tax rate and the corporate tax rate have the
wrong sign whenever they are significant, and it seems unclear whether the income tax
rate is at all significant. The contribution of the cost-of-entry variable (EE1) is ambiguous:
It seems significant, but has the wrong sign. The insignificance of per-capita GDP in all
regressions is quite striking as well.
4 Regression Results for Sample 2
4.1 Controlling for the Endogeneity of Taxes
The results in Table 3 are somewhat inconclusive, which could be due to the paucity of the
data on the dependent variable, or to some endogeneity bias that we could not take care
of. Sample 2 is much larger and may therefore allow us to obtain more reliable results.
Table 4 presents the regressions results.
= Insert Table 4 here =
Regression (5) is analogous to Regression (2). Since data on LR1 and EE1 are only
available for one year, they do not show in Regressions (5) and (7). Regressions (6) and
(8) include the alternative (time-varying) measures LR2 and EE2, so they do not lend
themselves to direct comparisons with the Sample 1 results.
The 2SLS estimation in Regressions (7) and (8) deserves explanation. It has been
argued that a country’s tax rates may to some extent be endogenous to its shadow economy
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(see Johnson et al. (1998)): If government tries to stabilize tax revenue by raising tax
rates whenever the shadow economy expands (and hence the tax base shrinks), then the
causality between tax rates and the underground economy would be reversed, and the
coeﬃcient estimates of Regressions (5) and (6) would be inconsistent.
Regressions (7) and (8) account for this possible simultaneity bias: The instruments
for country i’s tax rates are the corresponding tax rates of one (randomly assigned) neigh-
boring country j plus a common time trend. The data indicate that tax rates tend to
be closely correlated across neighboring countries. The identifying assumption is that a
country’s tax rates will not be changed in response to an expansion of the underground
economy in any of its neighboring countries. The common time trend is not a relevant
regressor at the second stage (once we control for all time-varying explanatory factors
including competition), but is likely to have an impact on the evolution of tax rates, in
particular since the period under consideration covers the run-up for the common currency
in Europe (the Euro area representing a quarter of our country sample).
The R2’s of the first-stage regressions range from 0.61 to 0.97, thus giving no indica-
tion for weak instruments. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of
consistent estimation of both Regressions (5) and (6) at the 1 percent significance level,
confirming the likely endogeneity of the tax rates.
Finally, the Sargan Test statistic (number of observations times the R2 from the re-
gression of the second-stage residuals on the instruments), which is chi-square distributed
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions (1 in our case),
has a value of 0.76398 (right-tail probability: 0.38) in Regression (7) and 0.31626 (right-
tail probability: 0.57) in Regression (8). Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
exogenous instruments.
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Let us now turn to the results presented in Table 4. Most importantly, the coeﬃcient
on competition is highly significant and has the predicted positive sign under all four
specifications. In terms of Regression (8), a one-standard-deviation increase in the com-
petition variable is associated with an increase in the size of the underground economy
(as share of oﬃcial GDP) of 4 percentage points, or 22 percent of the standard deviation
of the latter.
Note that the Flexibility Index is significant and has the expected negative sign: A
one-standard-deviation increase in the Flexibility Index is associated with a drop in the
size of the underground economy (as share of oﬃcial GDP) of 3.7 percentage points, or 21
percent of the standard deviation of the latter. Per-capita GDP is now highly significant
as well: Not surprisingly, more developed economies tend to have smaller underground
sectors. The corruption measure is significant only in Regression (8). With the exception
of the payroll tax rates, all tax rates tend to have the right sign now, although the income
tax rate is the only one that comes out significant under all four specifications. The
anomaly of the sign on the payroll tax rate remains, but it is no longer significant in
Regressions (5) and (6). The entry variable (EE2) seems significant, but its positive sign
is rather surprising.
Regression (8) is robust to dropping one country at a time, with coeﬃcients on the
competition variable ranging from 1.83 to 3.96. These coeﬃcients are significant at the
1 percent level, with one exception (significant at the 2 percent level when Indonesia is
dropped). Regression (8) is also robust to including time fixed eﬀects: The magnitude
and significance levels of the coeﬃcient estimates remain unchanged, and the Wald test
cannot reject the joint insignificance of the year dummies (test statistic = 8.59, which is
χ2 (5) under the null, so that probability is 0.1265). This result is reassuring given that
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the time trend was used as instrument for the tax rates: If we found that time also had
a direct influence on the dependent variable of the second-stage regression, this would
clearly violate the exclusion restriction.10
4.2 The Impact of Country Characteristics
Finally, recall that there are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that the impact of
competition on the incidence of shadow economic activities could also depend on other
country characteristics. As Posner (1996) pointed out, using formal market institutions,
though costly in terms of tax liabilities, allows to resort to state-guided legal enforcement
mechanisms in situations where opportunistic behavior and breach of contract have to
be considered likely, e.g. when contracting with total strangers, or if transactions are
non-simultaneous and long-term. This insight leads us to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Poor countries with low government revenue are not able to provide the
kind of public services that could induce firms to move to the oﬃcial sector and pay the
taxes that are needed to fund such services. Such countries are therefore more vulnerable
to a competition shock than countries oﬀering high-quality (though expensive) public
institutions that keep firms in the oﬃcial sector even if competition increases.
The second main result of my empirical analysis confirms this conjecture. Table 5
shows the regression results when interaction terms are included in the 2SLS specification
of Regression (8).
= Insert Table 5 here =
Competition does not seem to have a diﬀerential impact in countries where labor
markets are more regulated (Regression (11)) or where entry is more diﬃcult (Regression
10Recall though that the Sargan test did not give any indication for such a violation.
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(13)). The first of these two results suggests that we cannot generalize the findings of
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), who argue that the relationship between trade policy and
the informal sector in Colombia only existed for the period preceding a major labor market
reform that increased the flexibility of the Colombian labor market. In other words,
liberalizing the labor market does not in general neutralize the eﬀects of competition on
the shadow economy.
The remaining regressions in Table 5 show that the eﬀect of competition on the size of
the underground economy is significantly weaker when per-capita GDP is high (Regression
(9)), when corruption is low (Regression (10)), and when the tax rates are high (Regression
12).11 The interpretation to give to this result is that rich countries with high tax rates and
low corruption can oﬀer high-quality public enforcement services which make it worthwhile
for firms to opt for the oﬃcial economy even when competitive pressure increases. This
may also explain why the expansion of the underground sector was not as strong in the
OECD and CEE countries as it was in Asia and Latin America, even though all four
subsamples experienced a similar increase in the intensity of competition during the late
1990s (see Table 1).
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to explain the striking increase in the size of the underground
economy in both industrialized and developing countries during the late 1990s. I propose
a novel rationale for this expansion of the shadow economy: the intensity of market
competition among firms. The empirical analysis presented here was performed on a panel
11The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the four tax interaction terms in Regression (12) at
the 1 percent level. When the tax interaction terms are included one by one, each comes out negative and significant at the
5 or 1 percent level.
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that covers 42 countries (OECD, transition and developing countries) from 1995 to 2000.
The regression results show that tax rates, labor market regulation, and enforcement are
not the only forces behind the emergence of the underground economy. I find evidence
for my first hypothesis, namely that the growing incidence of shadow-economic activity
is indeed correlated with an increase in the intensity of competition during this period.
The second main finding of my empirical analysis is that the impact of competition on
the size of the underground economy is weaker in countries where per-capita GDP and tax
rates are high, and corruption is low. Rich countries with high government revenue and
low corruption are the ones that can oﬀer high-quality public enforcement services which
make it worthwhile for firms to opt for the oﬃcial economy even when competitive pressure
increases. This may also explain why the expansion of the underground sector was not
as strong in the OECD and CEE countries as it was in Asia and Latin America, even
though all four subsamples experienced a similar increase in the intensity of competition
during the late 1990s.
We can draw several policy implications from these results: First of all, liberalizing
product markets may come at the cost of an expanding underground economy, unless the
liberalization is accompanied by a more rigorous enforcement of tax laws. This eﬀect is
more likely to be felt in poor, corrupt countries with low tax revenue. Finally, liberalizing
the labor market may not be suﬃcient to countervail the negative eﬀects of intensified
product market competition on the size of the underground economy.
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6 Appendix A - Descriptive Statistics
Table 2C shows the correlation matrix for all variables used in the regressions (For an
explanation of the abbreviations used in Table 2C, see Tables 2A and 2B).
Note that the two measures for the underground economy, the one based on the
currency-demand approach (UE1) and the one based on the electricity approach (UE2),
are strongly correlated to each other (0.79). The correlation between the two measures
for labor regulation, LR1 and LR2, is much weaker (-0.33), while the two measures for
ease-of-entry, EE1 and EE2, do not seem to be correlated at all (-0.09).
Also note the high correlations between the absence-of-corruption measure (Corr) and
the two ease-of entry variables (EE1 and EE2) as well as the competition variable (Comp),
which brings to mind the findings of Ades and Di Tella (1999), who argue that the presence
of economic rents tends to be conducive to corruption.
Table 2C: Correlations among regression variables
UE2 GDP Corr LR1 LR2 PT IT CT VAT EE1 EE2 Comp
UE1 0.79 -0.57 -0.49 0.54 -0.13 0.04 -0.26 -0.24 0.13 0.13 -0.28 -0.20
UE2 -0.47 -0.47 0.40 0.06 -0.18 -0.15 -0.17 -0.13 0.29 -0.19 -0.16
GDP 0.75 -0.42 -0.03 -0.05 0.29 -0.02 0.10 -0.50 0.36 0.22
Corr -0.51 0.23 -0.17 0.38 -0.04 0.05 -0.42 0.64 0.54
LR1 -0.33 0.41 -0.03 0.08 0.22 0.10 -0.37 -0.18
LR2 -0.43 -0.14 -0.20 -0.41 0.03 0.47 0.23
PT 0.21 0.22 0.46 -0.19 -0.25 0.02
IT 0.04 0.34 -0.20 0.16 0.44
CT 0.03 -0.01 -0.21 -0.04
VAT -0.21 -0.12 -0.05
EE1 -0.09 -0.14
EE2 0.46
Table 2D reports correlations among the variables used in the regressions and alter-
native measures, as far as available. We see that ”Local Competition” (Comp) is fairly
correlated to the ”Eﬀectiveness of Antitrust” (Ant) as reported in the GCR, but both
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measures are uncorrelated to the imports of goods and services as share of GDP (Imp),
indicating that openness to foreign trade does not measure quite the same thing as local
competition.
As for the alternative measures of corruption, the GCR’s variable (Corr) is highly corre-
lated to both the World Bank’s ”Rule of Law” Index (ROL) and ”Control of Corruption”
Index (Corr-WB) as well as to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
2001 (Corr-TI).
The two measures of labor regulation, the World Bank’s Employment Laws Index from
the Labor Regulation database (LR1) and the GCR’s Flexibility Index (LR2) appear to be
correlated in the right way to the World Bank’s Employment Laws Index from the Doing
Business database (EL), although the (positive) correlation between the two World Bank
Indices is stronger than their respective (negative) correlation with the GCR’s Flexibility
Index.
Table 2D: Correlations among alternative measures
Comp Imp Corr-TI Corr-WB Corr LR2 LR1
Ant 0.61 0.05
Comp 0.09
ROL 0.94 0.97 0.87
Corr-TI 0.96 0.86
Corr-WB 0.89
EL -0.40 0.89
LR2 -0.33
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7 Appendix B - Tables
Table 1: The Underground Economy and Competition 1995-2000
Dependent Variables: (1) Underground Economy (Schneider),
(2) Underground Economy (own calc.), (3) Competition (GCR)
Regressor: Time Trend
(1) UE1 obs. (2) UE2 obs. (3) Comp obs.
Full Sample (42 countries) 0.36*** 105 0.87*** 252 0.48*** 252
(0.07) (0.32) (0.02)
OECD countries (26) 0.26*** 73 -0.65*** 156 0.49*** 156
(0.08) (0.18) (0.03)
Asia (12) 0.51*** 27 2.92*** 72 0.46*** 72
(0.07) (0.65) (0.05)
CEE (4) 0.88 8 -2.23*** 24 0.47*** 24
(0.72) (0.40) (0.06)
Latin America (7) 0.35*** 14 2.99*** 42 0.49*** 42
(0.03) (0.59) (0.06)
Country Fixed Eﬀect yes yes yes
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent.
Table 2A: Summary Statistics - Sample 1 (Schneider’s estimates)
stacked data
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Shadow Econ’y - Schneider (UE1) 99 21.57 10.69 7.80 59.40
Local Competition (Comp) 99 4.37 1.34 1.66 6.50
Per-capita GDP (GDP) 99 9.32 1.19 5.94 10.71
Low corruption (Corr) 99 4.83 1.58 1.37 6.91
Labor regulation:
1. Employment Laws Index (LR1) 99 1.50 0.45 0.81 2.35
2. Flexibility (LR2) 99 3.49 0.77 2.10 5.17
Payroll tax rate (PT) 99 27.00 15.97 0.00 61.00
Income tax rate (IT) 99 31.46 13.98 0.00 60.00
Corporate tax rate (CT) 99 31.94 6.65 15.00 55.00
VAT (VAT) 99 15.71 6.62 0.00 31.00
Ease of Entry:
1. Cost of Start-up (EE1) 99 20.00 41.19 0.40 269.00
2. New Business (EE2) 99 3.91 1.27 1.54 6.40
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Table 2B: Summary Statistics - Sample 2 (own calculations)
stacked data
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Shadow Econ’y - own calc. (UE2) 238 24.20 17.77 0.00 87.28
Local Competition (Comp) 238 4.54 1.10 1.66 6.50
Per-capita GDP (GDP) 238 9.16 1.22 5.94 10.71
Low corruption (Corr) 238 4.83 1.47 1.37 7.00
Labor regulation:
1. Employment Laws Index (LR1) 238 1.52 0.44 0.81 2.35
2. Flexibility (LR2) 238 3.70 0.85 2.00 5.81
Payroll tax rate (PT) 238 27.15 16.27 0.00 65.00
Income tax rate (IT) 238 29.66 13.72 0.00 60.00
Corporate tax rate (CT) 238 31.71 6.85 6.78 55.00
VAT (VAT) 238 15.67 6.48 0.00 31.00
Ease of Entry:
1. Cost of Start-up (EE1) 238 22.48 44.99 0.40 269.00
2. New Business (EE2) 238 4.38 1.16 1.54 6.45
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Table 3: Regression Results - Sample 1
Dependent Variable: Shadow Econ’y - Schneider (UE1)
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 43.70*** 36.07
(15.43) (24.37)
Competition (Comp) 2.50*** 0.39 2.20 0.37*
(0.80) (0.29) (2.34) (0.20)
Per-capita GDP (GDP) -2.72 -0.62 -1.56
(1.71) (5.81) (2.69)
Low corruption (Corr) -2.64** 0.04 -1.86
(1.12) (0.35) (1.65)
Empl. Laws Index (LR1) 9.67*** 9.70**
(1.88) (3.76)
Payroll tax rate (PT) -0.22*** 0.04 -0.14*
(0.06) (0.03) (0.08)
Income tax rate (IT) -0.09 0.05* -0.06
(0.12) (0.03) (0.19)
Corporate tax rate (CT) -0.15* -0.01 -0.37**
(0.08) (0.05) (0.14)
VAT (VAT) 0.35*** -0.14 0.25
(0.11) (0.12) (0.25)
Cost of Start-up (EE1) -0.07*** -0.06*
(0.02) (0.03)
Fixed Eﬀects no yes no yes
Country Time Trend no no yes yes
Number of observations 99 99 99 105
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.98 0.71 0.99
Standard errors (white heteroskedasticity-consistent) are in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent.
24
Table 4: Regression Results - Sample 2
Dependent Variable: Shadow Econ’y - own calculations (UE2)
Explanatory Variable (5) OLS (6) OLS (7)1) 2SLS (8)2) 2SLS
Competition (Comp) 2.05*** 2.11*** 3.01*** 3.58***
(0.77) (0.72) (1.12) (1.22)
Per-capita GDP (GDP) -81.65*** -87.48*** -88.43*** -94.14***
(12.16) (12.31) (11.32) (12.22)
Low corruption (Corr) 0.77 -0.17 -1.89 -3.90**
(0.74) (0.99) (1.38) (1.57)
Flexibility Index (LR2) -2.14* -4.39**
(1.26) (1.90)
Empl. Laws Index (LR1)
Payroll tax rate (PT) -0.06 -0.10 -1.93*** -1.38***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.41) (0.35)
Income tax rate (IT) 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.55*** 0.59***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
Corporate tax rate (CT) 0.08 0.08 0.77 1.49**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.63) (0.71)
VAT (VAT) 0.13 0.11 0.86 -1.01
(0.21) (0.23) (1.05) (1.14)
New Business (EE2) 1.75** 4.21***
(0.81) (1.21)
Cost of Start-up (EE1)
Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Common Constant no no no no
Number of observations 238 238 196 196
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90
Standard errors (white heteroskedasticity-consistent) are in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent.
1),2) tax rates are instrumented by the neighboring country’s tax rates and time trend
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Table 5: Interaction between Competition and Country Characteristics - Sample 2
Dependent Variable: Shadow Econ’y - own calculations (UE2)
IV-2SLS1)
Explanatory Variable (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Competition (Comp) 21.45*** 8.92*** 1.04 11.69*** 6.33**
(6.63) (2.47) (2.19) (3.54) (2.83)
Comp×GDP -1.92***
(0.64)
Comp×Corr -1.12***
(0.37)
Comp×LR2 0.71
(0.51)
Comp×PT -0.02
(0.03)
Comp×IT -0.16***
(0.04)
Comp×CT -0.10
(0.11)
Comp×VAT -0.04
(0.09)
Comp×EE2 -0.63
(0.50)
Per-capita GDP (GDP) -87.20*** -88.70*** -91.28*** -77.64*** -94.68***
(12.83) (11.34) (12.32) (11.22) (12.54)
Low corruption (Corr) -4.30*** 0.12 -3.78** -4.72*** -4.19***
(1.47) (1.64) (1.63) (1.63) (1.56)
Flexibility Index (LR2) -3.63** -3.93** -7.85** -4.87** -4.14**
(1.70) (1.73) (3.39) (1.89) (1.85)
Payroll tax rate (PT) -1.83*** -1.49*** -1.41*** -1.51*** -1.35***
(0.38) (0.34) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34)
Income tax rate (IT) 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 1.42*** 0.60***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.25) (0.09)
Corporate tax rate (CT) 1.28* 1.48** 1.60** 2.41*** 1.37*
(0.76) (0.71) (0.73) (0.89) (0.71)
VAT (VAT) -1.82 -1.48 -0.88 -1.61 -1.14
(1.55) (1.18) (1.17) (1.21) (1.12)
New Business (EE2) 4.18*** 3.95*** 4.28*** 4.58*** 6.53***
(1.08) (1.08) (1.23) (1.15) (2.44)
Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 196 196 196 196 196
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90
Standard errors (white heteroskedasticity-consistent) are in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent.
1) tax rates are instrumented by the neighboring country’s tax rates and time trend
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